Trump’s $15 billion Clash With NYT Sets Off Another Legal Campaign For Newsrooms

When a sitting or former president elects to seek $15 billion in damages from a single news organisation, the action reads less like a conventional libel suit than like a strategic campaign play writ in legal form. On Sept. 15–16, 2025, Donald Trump announced and filed such a complaint against The New York Times, several Times journalists and associated publishers, saying the outlet had run a “decades-long campaign of lies” and calling it “one of the worst and most degenerate newspapers in the history of our country.”

He added that the paper had become a “virtual mouthpiece for the radical Left Democrat Party.” There are three discrete frames in which to judge this case: constitutional law, newsroom practice and political theatre. Each offers a different prediction about whether the suit is likely to prevail, and each suggests distinct consequences for the institutions at stake.

On paper, American defamation Law establishes a steep hill for public figures. Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), plaintiffs who are public officials or public figures must prove “actual malice” — that the defendant published a falsehood knowing it was false, or with reckless disregard for the truth. That standard protects all but the most egregious reporting failures and demands evidence about a reporter’s state of mind at publication, not merely proof of factual error. Courts have repeatedly emphasised the difficulty of meeting that bar.

That legal wall is why suits by powerful plaintiffs often operate as instruments of leverage rather than purely as mechanisms to vindicate reputations. Consider the recent settlements Trump highlights: ABC agreed to make a $15 million contribution to a planned Trump library to resolve a dispute tied to inaccurate on-air comments, and Paramount/ CBS reached a $16 million settlement in another high-profile dispute.

Those outcomes do not equate to judicial findings of malice; they reflect the complex calculus that companies make when weighing the costs of protracted discovery, reputational risk, and the distraction of litigation. In the commercial realpolitik of media companies, settlement can be damage control rather than an admission of journalistic failure.

From a newsroom vantage, the stakes are stark. Big-budget investigative journalism depends on an institutional ability to accept legal risk, to check sources, document reporting decisions, and defend editorial judgement in court if necessary. The threat of repeated, high-value suits imposes a chilling tax: even if most claims fail, the process of discovery, private depositions, the cost of legal defence, the drain on editors’ time,  can incentivise self-censorship or encourage settlements that leave public records unexplored.

As one experienced newsroom lawyer put it in recent commentary about litigation pressure, the pattern of “rhetoric and actions” from political leaders can be mirrored across the information ecosystem, prompting smaller outlets to mimic defensive strategies long before a case reaches a judge.

NYT Building

Yet it would be a mistake to view this litigation as an empty bluff. Courts are not wholly captive to First Amendment concerns; they adjudicate harms and damages on the basis of evidence. The complaint against the Times, as reported, identifies specific articles and a book project and alleges that their claims were published with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard.

If Trump’s legal team can produce contemporaneous internal communications, contradictory witness testimony, or other documentary proof that reporters knew key claims were false, the suit could survive early motions. But that is a high evidentiary bar, and historically judges have dismissed similar high-stakes suits at early procedural stages when plaintiffs fail to plead facts that plausibly demonstrate actual malice.

The litigation is also a political communication. Publicising a multi-billion dollar suit amplifies a message: that major institutions are corrupt, that the plaintiff is under siege, and that legal action is evidence of fighting back. This is a form of signalling to a base that prizes grievance and retribution. As one commentator put it in an earlier Trump-era legal contest, some suits are “cartoonishly vexatious,” — not because they cannot be argued, but because their primary utility is to shift the news cycle and impose costs on opponents.

The lesson is twofold: litigation can be weaponised by the powerful, and legal doctrine (even a robust Sullivan standard) does not eliminate the practical asymmetry that comes with litigation’s cost and duration. Two other practical anchors should guide readers watching this case. First, the forum selection, filing in Florida, and it matters. Plaintiffs sometimes choose jurisdictions they perceive as more favorable or predictable; venue can affect pretrial orders and scheduling. Second, discovery will be decisive.

If the Times shows meticulous sourcing, contemporaneous notes, and editorial review that produced its stories, it strengthens its defence. Conversely, if the plaintiff can point to internal inconsistencies at the Times or to documentary proof of knowing falsehoods, the case could survive motions to dismiss.

ALSO READ: Trump Slaps $15 Billion Suit on NYT, Calls Daily ‘Degenerative’

However, there are immediate consequences. If courts reject overreaching suits and insist on the actual-malice standard, that outcome will protect the breathing room journalists need to pursue investigations. Instead, if high-value suits proceed on amorphous proofs and culminate in settlements, the result will be a more cautionary press, especially among mid-sized outlets without the Times’ legal resources.

Finally, Mr. Trump’s Truth Social post supplies the rhetorical raw material for the complaint. “The New York Times has been allowed to freely lie, smear, and defame me for far too long,” he wrote in his social media platform but rhetoric does not equal evidence. The coming months of motions, discovery and possible appeals will test whether the complaint is primarily performative or backed by the documentary and testimonial proof that the American law requires.

For now, newsrooms should do what they have always done when under legal pressure: document rigorously, be transparent about sourcing where possible, and explain to readers how and why reporting decisions were made. Courts will determine whether a legal line has been crossed or not. Editors must defend the sturdier, day-to-day work of truth-seeking journey that makes their determination possible.

London’s Far-Right Rally Sends Shockwaves Through South Asian Communities

London witnessed one of its most dramatic confrontations between far-right activists and anti-racism campaigners in recent memory this weekend. A march led by Tommy Robinson, founder of the English Defence League, drew an estimated 110,000 to 150,000 supporters, marking it as one of the largest right-wing gatherings in decades.

While organizers claimed even higher turnout, the rally descended into violence, leaving 26 police officers injured, four seriously, and 25 protesters arrested. For South Asians in the UK, who make up one of the country’s largest ethnic minority blocs, the violent rhetoric and size of the rally raise fresh concerns about rising hate crimes, and their identity of belonging.

The event, branded the “Unite the Kingdom” march, was celebrated by Robinson as a “tidal wave of patriotism.” Yet for many observers, the gathering was less about unity and more about exclusion. Anti-immigrant chants, placards criticizing multiculturalism, and speeches targeting Muslim communities made clear the undercurrent of hostility.

ALSO READ: Massive Anti-Immigration Rally in London Turns Violent, 26 Police Officers Injured

South Asians, particularly Muslims of Pakistani and Bangladeshi heritage, were indirectly placed in the crosshairs of this rhetoric. The clash between Robinson’s supporters and counter-protesters organized by Stand Up to Racism only deepened the sense that Britain’s immigrant communities are caught in the middle of an escalating ideological battle.

The South Asian footprint in the UK

According to the 2021 Census (ONS), South Asians form about 9.3% of the population in England and Wales. The breakdown highlights their importance in Britain’s demographic fabric:

  • Indian-origin population: ~1.86 million (3.1%).

  • Pakistani-origin population: ~1.59 million (2.7%).

  • Bangladeshi-origin population: ~0.6 million (1.0%).

  • Sri Lankan, Nepali and other South Asians: collectively ~0.3 million.

These communities are not just statistically significant; they are deeply woven into Britain’s social, cultural, and economic life. Indians form the backbone of the NHS’s medical workforce, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis drive the retail, hospitality, and transport sectors, while newer groups like Nepalis contribute heavily to service and defense.

The London rally revives memories of earlier flashpoints when South Asians became targets of xenophobia. Hate crime data from the Home Office shows a persistent rise in racially and religiously motivated offenses, with spikes often following political events such as Brexit or terror attacks. In 2022–23, police recorded over 109,000 hate crimes, with nearly 70% related to race.

South Asians, especially Muslims and Sikhs who are often mistakenly identified as Muslims, report a heightened sense of vulnerability after such rallies. Grassroots organizations warn that even when physical violence is limited, the psychological toll of being depicted as outsiders can erode trust in institutions and fray inter-community ties.

Generational divides: Young South Asians feel the heat

Second- and third-generation South Asians in Britain are often proud to identify as both British and Asian. However, far-right mobilizations complicate that identity. University campuses have seen rising incidents of racial harassment, and South Asian students often bear the brunt of verbal abuse in public spaces.

Gen-Z South Asians in London spoke on social media about avoiding certain neighborhoods during the rally and expressed anger at being indirectly portrayed as incompatible with Britishness. This sentiment echoes findings from the British Social Attitudes Survey, which noted that younger minorities increasingly feel less secure about their status in society compared to a decade ago.

The rally also arrives at a politically sensitive moment with elections looming in the UK, where immigration is again a headline issue. Far-right rhetoric influences mainstream parties, pushing them to adopt stricter stances on asylum and border control.

Rishi Sunauk with Indian PM Narendra Modi

South Asian communities, however, are no longer passive observers. They represent influential voting blocs in constituencies across London, Birmingham, Leicester, and Manchester. Indian-origin politicians like Rishi Sunak, the former Prime Minister, and several Labour MPs of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin reflect this growing political clout. But, many community leaders worry that rallies like Robinson’s could polarize voters further, hardening stereotypes and complicating their engagement with both major parties.

A global echo chamber

The London march did not exist in a vacuum. Elon Musk’s video address to the rally, criticizing Britain’s political class and invoking free speech anxieties—gave it international attention. Experts warn that far-right groups across Europe and North America are increasingly coordinated, sharing slogans, strategies, and even celebrity endorsements.

For South Asians, this global networking of extremist rhetoric is alarming. Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi diaspora communities in the U.S. and Canada have already faced the spillover effects of anti-immigrant sentiment. Analysts fear that what starts on London’s streets can embolden similar rhetoric abroad, further tightening the pressure on immigrant communities.

ALSO READ: U.S. Immigration Policy Shift: No Renewal for Humanitarian ‘Migrant Parole’ Program

Despite anxieties, South Asian communities have demonstrated resilience in the face of hostility. Community organizations, interfaith groups, and student associations mobilized rapidly during the London rally, ensuring counter-demonstrations remained visible and peaceful.

Several South Asian MPs condemned the violence, while business leaders highlighted the economic contributions of migrants. The NHS, universities, and city councils used the moment to reaffirm the importance of diversity in sustaining Britain’s institutions.

The London rally was framed by organizers as an assertion of patriotism, but for Britain’s South Asians, it was a stark reminder that questions of belonging are far from settled. While the community has built a visible and influential presence across sectors, the persistence of far-right mobilization threatens to undo decades of integration.

For now, South Asians are cautiously navigating rising hostility while shaping Britain’s future through political engagement, cultural leadership, and economic dynamism. As one activist in Leicester put it after the rally: “They want us out, but Britain cannot run without us.”

After tariffs, what’s Trump’s next Move? Watch out US dollar weakening

As the dust begins to settle down on President Donald Trump’s latest tariffs, speculation is growing over his next move. With the dollar as the world’s reserve currency, Trump has powerful tools to pressure allies—credit access, dollar funding, and payment systems, which may be wielded as powerful weapons to subject compliance from foes and allies together.

Deploying these weapons would carry major risks for the U.S. economy and could backfire, but some experts warn they remain on the table if tariffs fail to cut the trade deficit. A weakening US dollar can have wide-ranging effects across global markets, businesses, and consumers. When the dollar loses value against other currencies, imported goods become more expensive for American consumers, increasing the cost of electronics, automobiles, and household products. Inflationary pressures may also rise as businesses pass on higher costs, eroding purchasing power.

On the other hand, a weaker dollar benefits US exporters by making American goods and services more affordable for foreign buyers. This can boost demand for US-made products, potentially leading to increased revenues for companies with international markets. Sectors like manufacturing, agriculture, and tourism often see gains as foreign customers find US goods and destinations more cost-effective.

“I could well imagine Trump getting frustrated and trying to implement wacky ideas, even if the logic isn’t there,” Barry Eichengreen, economics professor at UC Berkeley, told Reuters.

The administration’s apparent goal is to weaken the dollar to rebalance trade, potentially through a Mar-a-Lago Accord—a nod to the 1985 Plaza Accord and Trump’s Florida resort.

Stephen Miran, a Trump adviser, has suggested the U.S. could pressure foreign central banks to strengthen their currencies by leveraging tariffs and security commitments. But analysts say such a deal is unlikely, as higher interest rates would risk recession in Europe and Japan, and China needs a weaker yuan to revive growth.

If currency talks fail, Trump could take more extreme measures, such as restricting foreign access to dollar liquidity. Cutting off Federal Reserve swap lines—vital for global banks in times of crisis—could roil financial markets and hit European, Japanese, and British lenders hardest. Investors and financial markets also react to a weakening dollar in various ways.

US-based investors with holdings in foreign assets may see gains as those investments appreciate in dollar terms. Conversely, foreign investors holding US assets could experience lower returns if the dollar depreciates. The currency’s decline may also impact the bond market, as investors demand higher yields on US Treasury securities to compensate for currency risk.

Though the Fed controls these programs, Trump’s reshuffling of key financial regulators has raised concerns. “It’s no longer unthinkable that this could be used as a nuclear threat in negotiations,” said Spyros Andreopoulos of Thin Ice Macroeconomics.

But such a move could ultimately weaken the dollar’s status as the world’s dominant currency.

Commodity prices often respond significantly to dollar fluctuations. Since key commodities such as oil and gold are priced in US dollars, a weaker dollar generally pushes their prices higher. This can lead to increased costs for businesses that rely on raw materials, further fueling inflationary trends. On the flip side, commodity-producing countries may benefit from stronger revenues as the prices of their exports rise.

Another pressure point is the U.S. payments industry. Visa (V.N) and Mastercard (MA.N) process two-thirds of card transactions in the eurozone. While China and Japan have developed alternatives, Europe remains reliant on U.S. payment networks.

If the White House pressured these firms to cut off services—similar to actions taken against Russia—European consumers would be forced to rely on cash or slow bank transfers. “A hostile U.S. is a huge setback,” said Maria Demertzis of the Conference Board think tank. International trade dynamics can shift as countries reassess their economic strategies in response to currency fluctuations.

Ultimately, a weaker dollar carries both advantages and disadvantages depending on one’s perspective. While US manufacturers and exporters may enjoy competitive benefits, consumers and businesses reliant on imports could face higher costs. Investors must navigate currency risks carefully, and policymakers must balance economic growth with inflation control. The dollar’s movements influence economies worldwide, making its strength or weakness a critical factor in global financial stability.

Weakening Dollar

A weakening US dollar can have wide-ranging effects across global markets, businesses, and consumers. When the dollar loses value against other currencies, imported goods become more expensive for American consumers. Precisely because it takes more dollars to buy the same amount of foreign currency, raising the cost of imported electronics, automobiles, and everyday household products. Inflationary pressures may also increase as businesses pass higher costs on to consumers, reducing purchasing power.

On the other hand, a weaker dollar benefits US exporters by making American goods and services more affordable for foreign buyers. This can boost demand for US-made products, potentially leading to increased revenues for companies with international markets. Sectors like manufacturing, agriculture, and tourism often see gains as foreign customers find US goods and destinations more cost-effective.

Investors and financial markets also react to a weakening dollar in various ways. US-based investors with holdings in foreign assets may see gains as those investments appreciate in dollar terms. Conversely, foreign investors holding US assets could experience lower returns if the dollar depreciates. The currency’s decline may also impact the bond market, as investors demand higher yields on US Treasury securities to compensate for currency risk.

Commodity prices often respond significantly to dollar fluctuations. Since key commodities such as oil and gold are priced in US dollars, a weaker dollar generally pushes their prices higher. This can lead to increased costs for businesses that rely on raw materials, further fueling inflationary trends. On the flip side, commodity-producing countries may benefit from stronger revenues as the prices of their exports rise.

Government policies may force the Federal Reserve respond by adjusting interest rates to stabilize the currency and control inflation. Meanwhile, other central banks might intervene in currency markets to prevent excessive volatility. International trade dynamics can shift as countries reassess their economic strategies in response to currency fluctuations.

 

Quick Analysis: What’s Middle East Conflict’s Potential Impact on Global Economy? 4 Possible Future Scenarios

Wall Street’s main indexes opened lower on Wednesday after escalation in geopolitical tensions in the Middle East though markets are likely not to come under sway. Here’s the impact visible so far and the possible future scenarios:

  • Israeli Retaliation: Iran’s missile strike on Israel, involving 180 ballistic missiles, significantly raises the chances of an Israeli counterattack. A likely target could be Iran’s Kharg Island facility, which handles 90% of the country’s oil exports.
  • Economic Risk: If Israel strikes and Iran responds by restricting access to the Strait of Hormuz—through which 20% of the world’s daily oil supply passes—crude oil prices could surge above $100 per barrel, similar to the 2022 spike following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
  • Central Bankers on Edge: The U.S. Federal Reserve and European Central Bank (ECB) are closely monitoring these developments. Energy price hikes from a prolonged conflict could derail plans to reduce interest rates, potentially reigniting inflation that central banks have worked hard to control.
  • Energy Supply Shock: Despite current stability—due to minimal casualties and Israel’s potential focus on Hezbollah in Lebanon rather than direct strikes on Iran—a severe disruption in oil exports would trigger energy supply shocks. Saudi Arabia’s ability to increase oil production could soften the blow, but sustained tensions could strain global supplies.
  • Inflation Dilemma: Central banks, especially in the U.S. and Europe, struggled to manage energy shocks during the 2022 power crisis, which led to inflation spiking to high-single-digit levels. A similar surge, along with other inflationary factors like the U.S. longshoremen strike, could force central bankers into a tough choice: either continue rate cuts and risk further inflation or pause/raise rates and push the economy toward recession.
  • Investor Sentiment: As of now, markets seem unaffected by these risks. In Europe, traders expect the ECB to cut rates again on October 17, while U.S. derivative prices suggest the Fed’s rates could fall to 3% by October 2025 from the current 4.9%.
  • Geopolitical Ripple Effect: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed Iran would pay for the attack, while Tehran warned of “vast destruction” in case of retaliation, signaling the possibility of a wider regional conflict. Any involvement by Israel’s allies could lead to a broader confrontation, further unsettling global markets.
  • Immediate Market Impact: Oil prices have already risen by 5%, with Brent crude trading at $75.3 per barrel amid concerns about escalating tensions.

Possible Future Scenarios

  1. Surge in Oil Prices: A direct strike on Iranian infrastructure, or a disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, could send oil prices soaring above $100 per barrel. This would have immediate inflationary consequences for the global economy, forcing central banks to reconsider planned interest rate cuts.
  2. Inflationary Pressures: A prolonged Middle East conflict could trigger another energy crisis, worsening inflation in the U.S. and Europe. Central banks may be forced to halt or reverse rate-cutting plans, risking a global economic slowdown or recession.
  3. Geopolitical Instability: Any military escalation between Israel and Iran could lead to broader regional conflict, drawing in global powers and further disrupting oil supplies. This could amplify investor fears and market volatility.
  4. Delayed Monetary Easing: If inflation spikes due to rising energy costs, the U.S. Federal Reserve and ECB may delay or slow down their plans for monetary easing, prolonging high borrowing costs and hindering economic recovery efforts. Even RBI might delay its decision to ease interest rate cuts now.

Coronavirus: Who is the loser in US-WHO rift? Global Health

When US President Donald Trump tweeted a letter to WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus last week threatening to make permanent the US freeze on WHO funding that began in April, unless the organization “can actually demonstrate independence from China” within 30 days, it has heralded another onslaught on fighting the coronavirus pandemic.

If President Trump sidelines the World Health Organization, experts foresee incoherence, inefficiency and resurgence of deadly diseases. The fissure between the United States and the World Health Organization has unveiled further the repercussions which could range from a resurgence of polio and malaria to barriers in the flow of information on COVID-19.

On the flip side, scientific partnerships around the world would be damaged, and the United States could lose influence over global health initiatives, including those to distribute drugs and vaccines for the new coronavirus as they become available, according to health experts.

“I don’t think this is an idle threat,” says Kelley Lee, a global health-policy researcher at Simon Fraser University in Burnaby, Canada. The acrimony is poorly timed when the need of the hour is for international coordination and cooperation to contain with the coronavirus. “In this pandemic, people have said we’re building the plane while flying,” Katz says. “This proposal is like removing the windows while the plane is mid-air,” said Rebeca Katz, director of the Center for Global Health at Georgetown University in Washington DC.

Trump’s Allegations

Trump’s letter, which he tweeted on 18 May, reiterated his earlier allegations that the WHO intentionally ignored reports that COVID-19 was spreading between people in Wuhan, China, in December itself. “I cannot allow American taxpayer dollars to continue to finance an organization that, in its present state, is so clearly not serving America’s interests,” he wrote.

A few of Trump’s claims such that the medical journal The Lancet had published on the new coronavirus in December was debunked the next day when the journal issued a statement calling the claim factually incorrect because their first reports on COVID-19 were published on 24 January.

Tedros has reiterated his commitment to an independent evaluation of the WHO’s response to COVID-19, and an assessment of the organization’s operations in the first part of 2020 that has already been made public. But when reporters asked Tedros, he said, “Right now, the most important thing is fighting the fire, saving lives.”

Last year, the US government gave the WHO roughly US$450 million. Nearly 75% of that was voluntary, and the other quarter was mandatory — a sort of membership fee expected from the 194 member countries, adjusted by the size of their economies and populations. The United States is the biggest donor, representing about 15% of the WHO budget.

So far this year, it has paid about one-quarter — $34 million — of its membership dues, according to a WHO spokesperson. Voluntary funds are more complicated because a large portion were paid last year, however the spokesperson says that the freeze has put a hold on new agreements, meaning that the full-blown effects of the decision will be felt in 2021.

The US government provides 27% of the WHO’s budget for polio eradication; 19% of its budget for tackling tuberculosis, HIV, malaria and vaccine-preventable diseases such as measles; and 23% of its budget for emergency health operations. David Heymann, an epidemiologist at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, says this will also amount to resurge of polio.

The WHO will survive a US funding freeze in the next few months as other donors will help to compensate for the financial gap during the pandemic. Already, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged $2 billion to the coronavirus response.

Even the United States would lose its influence on what the agency does and eventually lose its voting rights. Currently, only three countries — South Sudan, Venezuela and the Central African Republic — are in this category.

With that loss, the United States will relinquish its ability to shape health agendas around the world, says Lee. Ironically, that is exactly what the Trump administration is complaining about. “If the US pulls out and leaves a vacuum, it will be filled by other countries, like China,” she says. “You’ll see a self-fulfilling prophecy.”

 

 

Sensex Crashes by 1100 Points

While the market is going agogue over the sudden crash of Sensex by 1100 point in intra-day trading on Monday, eroding about Rs.4 lakh crore from the pockets of shareholders, there is one reason for optimists to smile.  BUY now!

Many TV show experts are suggesting the move to buy but foreign investors are driven by the ripple effect created by Yuan’s unrealistic devaluation that has all the potential to kick off another Asian Currency Crisis of the mid-1990s.

The ripple effect is seen in virtual shock and apathy in the trading session in the morning to make any trade decisions by buyers and brokers alike and even the Indian rupee hit a highest low of Rs.66.50, which is lowest since September 2013.

Monday’s market crash was the biggest after 2008 recession, as on October 24, 2008, it recorded a low of 1204.88 points. But Monday crash is different as it stems directly from the Yuan’s devaluation.

Speculations are high that the 2008 recession was driven by the US downturn while the 2015 would be the Year of China, with its extreme global reach. Another reason could be to bring the markets heed the global opinion on China’s political overtures, especially aimed at Japan.

Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on Monday cancelled his state visit to China and the political fallout could be a trigger to anti-China sentiments bringing down Asian markets for now. The long-term impact will be known only in a couple of months when markets continue to be volatile.

While the Indian market reacted cautiously last week when China announced one of its worst devaluation of Yuan, the possible market reaction in India on the opening day of the week is abrupt and unexplainable.

The slowdown of the Chinese economy may recover from its devaluation but it is strange to see the Indian market reacting similarly as devaluation of the Indian rupee on par with its Chines counterpart is unadvisable for the long term market stabilization.

However, the market needed to correct itself from the buoyant artificial picture being projected by the industry in India following the BJP win last year. Though the Modi government is known for its pro-business and pro-industry policies, the undue delay in passage of bills and the bedlam in parliament have had enough reasons not to cheer about for the industry.

In fact, Indian recovery map was not as great as China or the US since 2008 crash as its macro economic indicators like current account deficit and forex reserves remained same, said Nirmal Jain, Chairman and Managing Director IIFL in a TV show on CNBC-TV18.

Another reason for the abrupt fall is that FIIs or foreign investors are quick to withdraw their investments in India after the Chinese market went down over the Yuan devaluation. Unless Indian investors repose their faith in the markets, Sensex is unlikely to stabilize in the next few days, but experts have advised buying for their clients now.

Meanwhile, European markets have responded taking the curve down as of now and in few hours when the US West Coast opens its stock exchanges, the bells will ring in the effect at least initially.